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The fateful referendum is over!
President Erdoğan is a supremely skillful survivor, always
able to shift the blame of his past sins to his opponents. Even when he aknowledges some
accountability, as in the Ergenekon and "Sledgehammer" hoaxes and the Gülenist
involvement in the botched coup of July 15th 2016, he is immediately forgiven
by his devoted supporters.
Summary Until the Referendum
(Short Recap of Blog History.)
Erdoğan came to power in 2002 as the US choice for the
“moderate Islam” Project aimed to transform secular and nationalist Turkey of
Ataturk into a theocratic state that stressed piety and obedience rather than
national interest. Once induced to cooperate, leader of the Faith of of such a
flock would be an efficient servant of foreign interests. To this end, even the
reintroduction of the Caliphate could be in the books- such a regression into
the Ottoman system of government could be expected to win over the Muslim
World, particularly the Sunni.
All this was part and parcel of the “Greater Middle East
Project”, a long-winded plan to rearrange the Middle-East to suit US, Israeli
and Globalist interests. Erdoğan’s AKP government was to be the political
power apparatus inside Turkey, the Gülen movement would pull strings from
abroad, namely Pennsylvania, as it does in many CIA-targeted nations around the
world.
The prime instrument of the “moderate Islam” program was, of course,
Islam, and the only thing “moderate” about it was its subservience to Western,
particularly US interests.
An unpalatable demand on the Turkish Republic was the
creation of an independent Kurdish state, to be carved out of the territories of four sovereign
nations, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. The first three the US could isolate,
disrupt an deven bomb with impunity- Iraq had already gone through that
grinder- but Turkey, a NATO ally, was a delicate matter- any transformation
that happened there would have to maintain the appearance of a democratic
process supported by the people.
In the years following its amazing election victory in 2002,
endorsed visibly by the US and the West, Erdoğan’s AKP attacked the secular Kemalist institutions of the Turkish
Republic with unbridled vehemence. The Gülen cult, using religion and abusing
the needs of poorer students seeking education, had for years been providing assistance
and lodging, which came with a heavy dose of indoctrination. By the time
Erdoğan’s AKP achieved power, members of Gülen’s cult had graduated, infiltrated the
police and judiciary, and were forcing the jealously guarded gates of the military. Erdoğan’s AKP shielded
Gülenist activities, paving the way to ever greater infiltration, while Gülen’s
moles in the police were planting evidence and those in the judiciary were ordering massive
roundups based on that same evidence, “discovered” by the police who planted
them.
Turkey’s Kemalist elite, academicians, journalists and
especially officers, were herded to prison in great numbers. Those Turks who
saw themselves aligned with the West were dismayed to see the Western press and
leaders of opinion regard AKP’s policies as “reforms”. A large portion of the
Turkish press and media were directly linked either to the AKP or Gülen, most of the rest being reluctant to
bring too strong a criticism because of the vested interests of the moguls who owned them. True opposition dwindled. The protests on behalf of the victims of the
Ergenekon, "Sledgehammer" and related witchunts were downplayed or even altogether
ignored by most.
The “Resolution Process” (Çözüm Süreci), also known as the “Peace Process” (Barış Süreci) with the seperatist PKK militants and even
their imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan were duly launched, with US ambassador
Ricciardone taking trips and making contacts
in the Southeast.
The opposition inside the parliament was rendered ineffective
by making sure the party leaders never rocked the boat to the extent that US
interests could be threatened, and a %10 threshold assured that alternative
parties would never get any seats. The main opposition party, the CHP, enjoying
the support of the secular Kemalist voters because it had been founded by Kemal
Ataturk himself, supported the “Peace Process” talks even after the AKP broke them
off.
However, the strong fundamentalist slant of the AKP’s
“moderate Islam” policies had repercussions, and Erdoğan’s aggressive,
haranguing style made matters worse. The Gezi uprising of 2013 almost toppled
the AKP and put the Turkish leg of the Greater Middle East Project in jeopardy.
(See: "Closing the Gezi Year", 23 Aralık-December 2013) After that, President Obama started to
distance himself from Erdoğan, and for a while it seemed as if CHP’s
Kılıçdaroğlu was jockeying for the role of the next favorite of the US. (A trip
to the US, luncheons and tête-à-têtes with Ambassador Ricciardone).
Predictably, strains between Erdoğan and the Gülen cult started to show.
The Erdoğan-Gülen cooperation was still functioning at the end of the summer of 2013; The Gülenist judges passed the severe Ergenekon
judgments on August 5th, 2013, with a great number of life sentences passed out
to the most respectable of names. Extreme security measures kept protesters
away from the courthouse, situated
inside the notorious Silivri
prison. (See: "Ergenekon Trials and Tribulations", 30 Ağustos-August 2013.) Just months later, on December 17th, 2013, that same judiciary launched
raids into the homes of close relatives of AKP bigwigs, including Bilal Erdoğan, the prime minister's son,
exposing a Money-laundering scheme. (It was something that hurt the US
interests more than Turkish ones, having to do with the clandestine export of
Iranian oil.) The war was on between
ex-favorite Erdoğan and the US tool and puppet, Gülen. Erdoğan struck back with a vengeance, declaring the Gülen cult
a “parallel state” (we could have told him that; in fact, we HAD been telling him that), and vowed to
sift it out.
Right:
Turkish humor magazine Uykusuz,
February 23rd 2014; Valentine theme
parodying the Erdoğan-Gülen break-up.
In sifting out the Gülenist “parallel state” that would
threaten his power through scandal, Erdoğan was also sifting out the instigators of
the Ergenekon, Sledgehammer and related witchhunts and showtrials, and with their
tormentors gone, the road was open to the retrial of all, and their eventual
acquittal.
With US support wavering, Erdoğan reduced the pressure
towards Islamization, the requirement of the “moderate Islam” program, and
started playing all cards at once. Erdoğan the Nationalist had arrived, but
Erdoğan the pious champion of Islam was still there. His popularity soared, there
was no more talk of a “resolution process” that would pave way for an
independent Kurdish state, so much sought by the US. Prime minister Erdoğan
pressured for an elected presidency rather than an appointed one as hitherto,
and thanks to the appallingly poor choice of the CHP/MHP joint candidate (and a
no-holds-barred campaign by the AKP) he acceded to the Presidency on August 10th 2014.
Kılıçdaroğlu’s opposition CHP seized the hot potato of
Kurdish seperatism all too willingly when it endorsed the Kurdish-seperatist
HDP and boosted it over the threshold into parliament in the elections of
June 7th, 2015, sacrificing a portion of its own votes in the process. Moreover,
Kılıçdaroğlu’s CHP had been further implicating itself by taking up the cause
of the persecuted and arrested police officers, prosecutors and judges who had
been acting under Gülen’s order- took up their cause more zealously, in fact, than it had for the
witchunt victims who had so severely suffered through their machinations, and
this did nothing to polish the image of the party once founded by Kemal Ataturk
himself.
Erdoğan’s anti-nationalist acts ebbed out, tensions with the
representatives of the secular Kemalist
Republic, particularly the military, eased. The PKK strongholds in the
east, with arms and ammunition stockpiled during the “resolution process”, were
smashed with military force.
Then came the coup attempt of July 15th 2016. Erdoğan called
citizens to the streets to face the tanks and helicopters. There is evidence
supporting the cliam that it was launched by Gülenists who had infiltrated into
the Forces and were to be sifted out with the coming promotions (in August). The
Chief of Staff and the commanders of the Forces were kidnapped in the prelude,
and indeed soldiers combatted soldiers. It was all over within 24th hours, with
close to 250 dead.
What followed was a show of reconciliation where the
rivalling parties seemed to bury the hatchet.
But ever fearful of a successful coup, and visibly spooked by the tanks
and jets of July 15th, Erdoğan’s AKP simply shut down all military schools and
expelled the students, dealing the greatest blow since the witchtrials.
On July 24th the Turkish military launched Operation
Euphrates Shield, targeting not only ISIS but the the PYD as well, the Syrian
version of the PKK, allied to the US. Erdoğan, once so willing to go along
with US plans for an independent Kurdistan, was now seen as the hero defending
the unity of the land while the CHP under Kılıçdaroğlu, with its open support
for the Kurdish-seperatist HDP, began to appear more and more like a traitor.
The Referendum:
With his undeniable skills as a survivor and his fiery style Erdoğan won ever wider public support by answering back to the arrogant Western powers. He cultivated the image of one who dares to contradict, a sure defender of national interests.
Erdoğan was ready and willing to take the next step towards absolute power, a "presidential system" with a new constitution which would abolish the office of the Prime Minister and give more, in fact unprecedented powers to the President. Still, it was not politic to blow one's own trumpet, so soon after the coup attempt that was squashed in what was flaunted as a "victory for Democracy" (though hardcore Erdoğan supporters saw it as a victory of Islam). Almost on cue , Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the second opposition party MHP, resurrected the dormant issue on October 11th, 2016. In view of his record of critical rethoric towards the Government, it seemed absurd and incomprehensible that an opposition leader like Bahçeli should propose and then enthusiastically endorse a new system that would grant Erdoğan even greater powers.
Erdoğan and his advisers must have found it risky to bring up the issue themselves, so soon after the failed coup. The proposal had to come from outside, from an allegedly "disinterested" party. A historical precedent would be the declaration of the second German Reich following the Prussian-led victory of a coalition of German states against France in 1870. The Prussians wished to use the victory to forge a united Germany under Prussia. King Ludwig II of Bavaria was chosen to propose to King Wilhelm of Prussia the emperor's crown, and history tells us he was forced to do sign the "Kaiserbrief", offering Wilhelm the crown.
Mural from the Kaiserpfalz in Goslar, Germany, depicting the founding of the second German Reich. Bavaria's King Ludwig is depicted presenting the Kaiser's crown to Prussia's Wilhelm while other German kings and princes look on.
(Part of a cycle of paintings by Hermann Wislicenus)
The first attempt was to block the move within parliament; but there were enough parliamentarians available for purchase to push the motion through, in spite of some fierce resistance, like the very brave and conscientious independent MP Aylin Nazlıaka who handcuffed herself to the microphone and from there pleaded directly with Bahçeli to retract (January 19th, 2017.) She was removed, by no means delicately, by Erdoğan's AKP lackeys.
AKP lady MP's trying to pry away Nazlıaka (center) from the microphone.
(Image from the media.)
Since then,
there has been a massive, no-holds-barred campaign for "yes" votes,
wherein the government made full use of means available to the State, including
inexhaustible funds, state authority, and considering the provisional security
measures in effect since the failed coup, even the force of the law.
Images of a larger-than-life president. During the two months of campaigning the country was plastered with images of the strongman that would be even stronger.
(Images from my camera.)
Left: Leaving no avenue untried, Erdoğan's campaigners used all possible media to build up the image of the hero.
Poster of a film about his rise as the hero of the people and books extolling his qualities as a leader. The title of the film, Reis, means "Chief" and is the way his admirers and followers like to call him. The title of the book, Lider, is of course "Leader".
(Images from my own camera.)
No one could
have expected the Islamist Erdoğan to forego the tried and true tactic of
abusing religious sentiments and many imams reportedly preached the virtues of
a “yes” vote to the assembled pious. Reaching out to the vast rural population Erdoğan regularly invited the muhtars (local authorities on the village level) to vast banquets at his
spanking new “palace”- attendance compulsory! Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım
beamed from huge posters like a candidate, pushing for a “yes” vote, even
though the new system would do away with the office of the Prime Minister
altogether- an almost comic absurdity.
Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım beaming like a candidate while campaigning for a "Yes" vote that would abolish his office.
(Image from the media.)
But no more absurd than so-called “opposition”
MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli appearing on his own giant banners to plug a system
that was concocted to give
Erdoğan even greater powers than he has up to now
usurped.
Left:
Banner with "opposition" party leader Bahçeli endorsing the "Yes" campaign.
(Image from my own camera.)
Lacking any
semblance of a convincing argument in their favor, Erdoğan and the “Yes” faction
decided they would have a better chance
if they could foster the illusion of an election of a government rather than a
referendum for a new system. Accordingly, they tried to turn it into a AKP-CHP
rivalry, hurling accusations on CHP chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. This, of
course, was patently absurd: Erdoğan would remain President with the AKP in
power until 2019, whatever the outcome. Besides, the new system would benefit
whoever would manage to hustle to power after that, even their arch rival Kılıçdaroğlu,
and though his most fanatical supporters don’t want to acknowledge it, Erdoğan,
too, is only a mortal.
Another tactic
of the “Yes” camp was the childishly absurd ploy of “guilt by association”; the
Kurdish seperatist HDP was campaigning for “No” as were the insurgents known as
the PKK. Likewise, Fethullah Gülen supported a “No” vote. So, the argument
went, you would be aligning yourself with them if you too voted for “No”, and
as such, would be no better than a traitor! (Never mind that Erdoğan and the
AKP had once been in close cooperation with the Gülen cult and promised the world
to the PKK during the “resolution process”.) This lopsided argument was voiced
by men whose duty it was to embrace the nation and defend our liberties-
President Erdoğan himself included, but I must say Bahçeli of the “opposition” excelled himself,
becoming far more obnoxious than Erdoğan ever had been at the height of the Gezi riots of 2013!
For weeks the
“yes” vs “no” argument was the main topic in the country; our servicemen fighting
and dying in Syria receded into the background. The fact that some 16400 cadets
had been expelled and all military schools shut down, all military hospitals
transferred to civilian authority, did not even make the news anymore, barring
a modest number of picketers assembling weekly, with only Ulusal TV and the Aydınlık
newspaper reporting.
Cadets dishonourably discharged for being there during the coup attempt- the ones who aren't actually in prison- demonstrating for their rights with the support of their families at Beşiktaş, Istanbul, on April 22nd, 2017.
A distressed mother is having her say at the microphone.
(Image from my own camera.)
The social media buzzed with “Yes” and “No” messages, both
sides often resorting to the “guilt by association” formula, though I must say
the “Yes” camp did that a lot more, having little else to hold on to.
The “Yes”
campaign was run with a desperation that hinted that a high “No” vote would
have catastrophic consequences for the ruling clique, to which Bahçeli,
erstwhile “opposition”, had now attached himself at the risk of estranging his
party and supporters.
There is all
sorts of speculation as to what these consequences might be. I still hold on to
my assertion that Erdoğan sees the
strengthened presidency as another step on the ladder to a reinstated
monarchy- he has on repeated occasions referred to some past sultans as “my grandfather”. (See: "Turkey's Third Reich?", 9 Haziran-June 2016.)
Left: This poster put up in Çankırı in October 2016 reads "Grandson of the Ottoman, Leader of Islam, WELCOME".
(Image from the Media.
If I am correct in my suspicions, he will be following in the footsteps of Louis Napolen who was
voted President of the French Republic in the wake of the 1848 upheavels. When his term ran out in 1851, he extended it
through a coup, followed by a referendum which endorsed his claim. He immediately brought constitutional changes to consolidate his power. A year later, in 1852,
he followed up with another referendum, this time seeking public endorsement to
a more ambitious claim: the throne of his uncle. He was crowned Napoleon
III, Emperor of the French, and inaugurated a reign with all the pomp
associated with the title. After all the bloodshed of the French revolutions
(1789, 1830, 1848), the Republic
Française thus returned to abolutism, and by popular vote. An argument with
Prussia over the Spanish succession led to a war that brought the new French Empire crashing
down (1870), the whole affair deteriorating into the internecine slaughter
of the French Commune (1871).
Napoleon III as painted by Franz Xavier Winterhalter and the Hôtel de Ville in flames as French kill French during the Paris Commune: a tragic end to dreams of glory.
While
Erdoğan’s campaigners gave their all to persuade the sceptics that the new
system would strenghten the republic, more firmly establish democratic rule,
and even be in line with Ataturk’s wishes (laughably absurd), it is clear
another message was being doled out to his supporters in ultra-conservative
circles. Just as the public resistance to the July 15th coup attempt had been a
victory of democracy to some, but a triumph of Islam and even a proof of the
inviolability of Erdoğan’s sacred person to others, the referendum was being touted
as a step up the democratic ladder to the intellectual voter while for the
conservative fanatic, it was a return to the theocratic Ottoman Empire, with
Erdoğan as Sultan and Caliph as the the self-styled descendant of the line.
Voters abroad parading to the ballots in consulates attired in caftan and
turban à la Ottomane could not have been much concerned with democracy and the
Republic.
Right: Erdoğan as Man of the Republic.
"The Public says 'Yes', the Republic grows Stronger".
Poster in Kadıköy district in Istanbul, an area not responsive to appeals in a religious and neo-Ottoman vein.
(Image from my own camera.)
Left: "Yes" voter in Strasbourg, France, casting his ballot at the Turkish consulate. The imperial age he yearns for had no use for ballot boxes and public opinion.
Image from the media.)
Erdoğan’s
opponents supporting a “No” vote demonstrated abroad in such an ill-concieved
and tactless fashion that one wonders whether the organizers were secretly
hoping for a “Yes” outcome: large groups disdaining to carry the Turkish flag,
but waving the banners of the hated PKK, it’s Syrian conterparts PYD and YPG,
and images of PKK leader Öcalan, provoked national feelings and pushed the
Turkish voters to Erdoğan’s camp. Completely disassociating himself from the
“resolution process” talks with the PKK, Erdoğan emerged as the hero standing
up against the Western-supported PKK terror. Anti-Erdoğan protests that attacked Turkey as a nation were even harder to understand, since the ugly spectacle was even surer to drive Turkish voters to a defiant superman.
Images that cannot possibly win over: from the Basel carnival (Fasnacht) in Switzerland, March 6th 2017.
(Images from the media.)
A monumental idiocy on part of
Dutch authorities in Rotterdam played into Erdoğan’s hands much more than he
could have hoped for. On March 11th, 2017, the Dutch denied landing permission to the plane of Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. It was decided to sneak a minister in and the AKP Minister for Family and Social Policies, a woman with a hijab named Fatma Sayan Kaya, was sent
overland from Germany, appearing in Rotterdam on the same evening, where she was stopped and even refused entry
to the Turkish consulate. She was forcibly deported afterwards.
Dutch police refuse Minister Kaya entry to the Turkish consulate in Rotterdam.
(Image from the Media.)
Offended, and no doubt roused into action, ethnic
Turks came out in support of their wronged minister, and clashed with the police- who went against the demonstrators with dogs. Photos of Dutch police
dogs biting into Turkish flesh offered the perfect opportunity for Edoğan to
harangue the Dutch as “Nazis”, raise the ghost of Srebrenica, and emerge as the
powerful protector of the Turks against the Infidel.
Dutch treatment of ethnic Turkish demonstrator, Rotterdam, March 11th 2017.
(Image from the media.)
The insistence on campaigning in a country against the decisions of the authorities of that country smacks of provokation. An AKP MP (Hüseyin Kocabıyık, MP for İzmir) commented that Holland ought to be thanked since their actions had boosted the "Yes" vote by two points! Ironically, the AKP regime had itself prohibited all campaigning outside national borders (electoral law 5479 clause 94 A, dated March 22nd, 2008) and was thus breaking its own law.
Left: Another example of what NOT to do: Swiss newspaper of March 13th, 2017, exhorting in Turkish to "vote NO against Erdoğan's dictatorship". Such obvious meddling from abroad was bound to be counter-effective.
With the AKP’s
record, there was no reason to expect fairplay at the ballots and the counting,
but the claims and images that started circulating immediately afterwards
exceded even previous elections. A videoclip shows an old Syrian refugee woman,
hastily given citizenship status like many of her compatriots in time for the
referendum, with an official and an interpreter, outside the ballot booth,
obediently putting the stamp where she is told. Others show ballots being
stamped for “yes” en masse! One shows unmarked ballot envelopes stamped with
the obligatory seal after the fact; we hear the voice of the person recording
the image
saying “you are now commiting a crime”, which doesn’t seem to impress
the culprit at all.
Right: From one of the many You-Tubed videos on the Internet, this one showing the "Yes" areas stamped in series.
Even though
the rules specifically required that all votes be cast in envelopes stamped in
advance with the seal of the High Election Board (Yüksek Seçim Kurumu), the
same board chose to accept 2.5 million unstamped envelopes, in spite of
protests.
Erdoğan got
his was by the slimmest of margins. (%51.4 "Yes" to %48.6 "No".) He lost all major urban centers, and many
neighbourhoods that had been AKP strongholds. He couldn’t afford to cancel any
contested votes, so he was certainly not going to honor any objections or call
on impartial observers.
Protesters
rallied before the offices of the Board the very
night of the polls, and some
protests followed in various cities.
Left: Ulusal channel reporting the protest before the Election Board on the night.
But the overall reaction remained feeble- there was not to be another Gezi. Amazingly, the
Vatan Party held its supporters back, advising against a confrontation: its
leader Perinçek declared it would be improper “to appear on the same side as
the PKK and Gülen”- echoing the AKP campaign argument against a “No” vote. Perinçek
gives precedence to the suppression of the PKK and its partners in Syria, even
if it means a confrontation with the US over the issue, and is for a united
Turkey, preferably not under Erdoğan, but preferring unity under Erdoğan to a
divisive democratic struggle with so many conflicting camps. Perinçek is also
for allowing Erdoğan room to clear all Gülen adherents from government and
state institutions, even though there can be, and cleary have been, excesses in
the implementation and a program to replace vacancies with his own followers.
Kılıçdaroğlu’s
CHP banks on secularism to hold the Kemalist vote but gives signals towards
negotiated solutions with the PKK- the “resolution process” all over again- and
is close enough to the US to give barely concealed support to the Gülen
movement. The possible secession of the southeasern provinces to a newly
fashioned Kurdistan does not seem to be a matter of concern for Kılıçdaroğlu
and the party leadership.
The AKP is
Erdoğan’s tool for power, and the referendum victory, contested as it is, has
allowed him to return to the head of the party. (The law had hitherto required
that the President sever all contact with his
political party, and maintain a neutral stance before all parties.)
Since his breakup with Gülen and deviation from the path prescribed by the US,
he has become more of a riddle. Long standing Ottoman Islamist, recent
nationalist representing and ostensibly defending the Republic, it is hard to
say where he really stands- as difficult as to make out what other nations
really make of him and how they plan to react. At the end of the day,
Erdoğan’s cause may be nothing more than himself, switching policies according
to what he sees as his best chance for survival and power. Ironically, he still
has what it takes to become a hero, if he could really flush out the Gülen
infiltration that he and his party once aided and abetted, force the US to
backtrack in Syria, crush PKK insurgence without victimizing the ethnic Kurdish
population, provide a concensus on a Kurdish/Turkish identity, let up on the
forced Islamization program and return to a secular state that is less
suspicious of conservative Muslim practices,
nurture a Muslim outlook that is more open to the secular viewpoint,
return to the Armed Forces the honor and authority due to the crucible and guardian
of the Republic, and ultimately step back from his newly acquired powers and
establish- or re-establish- a more democratic form of government before leaving
the stage. He can do all of this, he certainly has the inflated opinion of
himself that could possibly motivate him towards such a transformation. Whether
he would really want to is yet to be seen.
Neo-Ottoman Islamist or secular Republican? Ataturk's nemesis or emulator? Erdoğan is hard to grasp. Photo from Ankara, April 2017.
As for other
nations, we still remember how they had eulogized Erdoğan as a reformer when
his hardly democratic practices served their purposes. Now with ever increasing
conflict with Western interests, the Western media is demonizing him. Some observers
prefer the expression “Saddamizing”, and the implication is clear: preparing
the public opinion for a time when another US-led “international coalition” may
be called upon to remove him by force. Though there are certainly some in
Turkey who would not be averse to such a last resort solution, if all else
fails, I know most of the population, Erdoğan’s hardest critics included, would
choose to rally round a dictator if the country is under attack.
It is my
conviction that to be “saved” by foreign Powers, even from a Saddam-style
dictator, would have a catastrophic effect on Turkish identity because it would
deprive us of the greatest treasure we possess: the heritage of the War of
Independence, the founding of the Republic and the Reforms, which provide the
almost subconscious pride and self assurance of being a nation that has saved
and renewed itself without an outside benefactor. If it ever comes to being
rescued from our own leaders by armies in foreign uniform, we can never be the
same!
